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in Antistructuring Violations
I. Introduction
In 1986, Congress made it a crime to structure monetary transac-
tions with domestic financial institutions for the purpose of avoiding
currency transaction reports, which are required for currency transac-
tions exceeding ten thousand dollars.' Therefore, if you wished to de-
posit sixteen thousand dollars in your bank account without drawing
undue attention from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and you
subsequently deposited eight thousand dollars on one day and eight
thousand dollars on the next, then you managed to avoid the filing of
a currency transaction report (CTR); however, you also managed to
commit a crime, subjecting yourself to a penalty of no more than two
hundred and fifty thousand dollars, or to imprisonment for no longer
than five years, or both.
No ifs, ands, or buts. At least that was the interpretation of ten
courts of appeals before the Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf v.
United States.2 Now, thanks to the Court, you can escape criminal liabil-
ity as long as you are unaware that what you are doing is illegal.
11. Statement of the Case
A. Facts of the Case
On October 27, 1988, Waldemar Ratzlaf, along with his wife
Loretta, entered the High Sierra casino in Reno, Nevada, carrying a
shopping bag filled with cash.3 Mr. Ratzlaf intended to satisfy a gam-
bling debt of one hundred and sixty thousand dollars that he incurred
while playing blackjack seven nights earlier. Indeed, Mr. Ratzlaf had
the one hundred and sixty thousand dollars in the bag.4
Unfortunately, however, Mr. Ratzlaf did not wish the IRS to learn
of his payment to the casino, and the casino was unwilling to accept
the one hundred and sixty thousand dollars in cash without complet-
1 Congress enacted 31 U.S.C. § 5324, the antistructuring provision, as part of the
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, Tit. I, Subtit. H, § 1354(a), 100 Stat.
3207. For the text of § 5324, see infra note 15 and accompanying text.
2 Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
3 United States v. Ratzlaf, 976 F.2d 1280, 1281 (9th Cir. 1992).
4Ic.
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ing a CTR and filing it with the government. 5 The casino did inform
Mr. Ratzlaf that payment by cashier's check would be acceptable and
would not require a CTR, and it provided him a limousine and driver
for transportation to local banks.6
The Ratzlafs, accepting the casino's hospitality, made use of the
limousine and driver the very next day, visiting several banks in State-
line, Nevada, and South Lake Tahoe, California. 7 At each bank visited,
Mr. Ratzlaf and his wife purchased, or attempted to purchase, cashier's
checks in amounts of less than ten thousand dollars.8 As a result of
their expedition, Mr. Ratzlaf was able to repay seventy-six thousand
dollars of his debt in cashier's checks and thereby avoid the filing of a
CTR by the casino. 9 Over the course of the next two months Mr.
Ratzlaf repaid the remaining debt in a similar manner, i.e., he contin-
ued to obtain cashier's checks in amounts of less than ten thousand
dollars. 10
B. In the District Court
On November 20, 1990, Mr. Ratzlaf, his wife, and the driver of the
limousine were all indicted by a federal grand jury and charged with
the following: "(1) conspiracy to structure or assist in structuring fi-
nancial transactions for the purpose of evading reporting require-
ments; (2) four counts of structuring currency transactions to evade
reporting requirements; and (3) interstate travel in aid of racketeer-
ing."' At trial in the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada, 12 the jury convicted Mr. Ratzlaf on all charges, his wife on the
conspiracy and interstate racketeering charges, and the driver of the
limousine on the conspiracy charge, two of the structuring charges,
and the interstate racketeering charge.' 3
Structuring of financial transactions to avoid CTRs is prohibited
by section 5324 of Title 31 of the United States Code. x4 Titled "Struc-
5 See i. A CTR is required when the casino accepts more than ten thousand dollars in
currency. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(2) (1993).
6 A CTR would not be required by the casino if only cashier's checks were used; cash-
ier's checks are excluded from the definition of currency. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11 (e) (1993).
7 Ratz/af, 976 F.2d at 1281.
8 1d Banks are not required to file CTRs for a cashier's check that is less than ten
thousand dollars. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1)
(1993).
9 Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 657 (1994) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
10 Ratzaf 976 F.2d at 1282.
11 Id. The common element to all charges is the structuring in which the Ratzlafs en-
gaged; hence, a defense to structuring is a defense to all charges.
12 See id. at 1280.
13 Id. at 1282 & 1282 n.1. Mr Ratzlaf was sentenced to fifteen months in federal prison
and three years supervised release; he was fined $26,300 and charged a special assessment of
$300. 1d at 1282-83. Mrs. Ratzlaf was sentenced to five years probation, including ten
months home detention; she was fined $7,900 and charged a special assessment of $100. Id
at 1283.
14 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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turing transactions to evade reporting requirement prohibited," sec-
tion 5324 provides in relevant part:
(a) Domestic coin and currency transactions.-No person shall
for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section
5313(a), section 5325, or the regulations issued thereunder... with
respect to such transaction-
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to struc-
ture or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more
domestic financial institutions.
15
Section 5313(a)16 referred to in section 5324, and regulations promul-
gated under its authority,' 7 require financial institutions to report cur-
rency transactions involving more than ten thousand dollars.18
The "willful" violation of section 5324(a) is made a crime by sec-
tion 5322(a).1 9 Titled "Criminal penalties," section 5322 provides in
relevant part:
(a) A person willfully violating this subchapter or a regulation
prescribed under this subchapter (except section 5315 of this title or a
regulation prescribed under section 5315) shall be fined not more
than $250,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.2 0
15 Id. Subsection (b) of section 5324 likewise prohibits structuring in the international
scenario; it provides:
No person shall, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of
section 5316-
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or as-
sist in structuring, any importation or exportation of monetary
instruments.
31 U.S.C. § 5324(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
16 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
17 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1993).
18 Likewise, § 5316, referred to in § 5324(b), is tided "Reports on exporting and im-
porting monetary instruments," and provides in relevant part:
a person or an agent or bailee of the person shall file a report under sub-
section (b) of this section when the person, agent, or bailee knowingly-
(1) transports, is about to transport, or has transported, monetary
instruments of more than $10,000 at one time-
(A) from a place in the United States to or through a place
outside of the United States; or
(B) to a place in the United States from or through a place
outside the United States; or
(2) receives monetary instruments of more than $10,000 at one
time transported into the United States from or through a place outside
of the United States.
(d) Cumulation of closely related events.-The Secretary of the Treasury
may prescribe regulations under this section defining the term "at one time"
for purposes of subsection (a). Such regulations may permit the cumulation of
closely related events in order that such events may collectively be considered
to occur at one time for the purposes of subsection (a).
31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
19 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
20 Id. (emphasis added). A violation of § 5315, which requires "reports on foreign cur-
rency transactions conducted by a United States person or a foreign person controlled by a
United States person," 31 U.S.C. § 5315 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), does not lead to criminal
penalties under § 5322. This is the only exclusion made by § 5322, and thus, a violation of
1994]
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The Ratzlafs appealed their convictions, contending that the trial
judge misstated the elements of the crime of structuring financial
transactions to avoid CTRs.21
The trial judge instructed the jury that to be guilty of the crime of
structuring, the defendants only needed: (1) to have knowledge of a
financial institution's duty to report CTRs for transactions involving
ten thousand dollars or more; (2) to have knowingly and willfully struc-
tured, or attempted to or assisted in, structuring of a currency transac-
tion involving a financial institution; and (3) to have done so purposely
to avoid the reporting obligation of a financial institution. 22 The trial
judge specifically instructed the jury that the defendants did not have
to have knowledge that structuring itself is illegal; they only needed to
have knowingly engaged in the act of structuring with the intent to
avoid a financial institution's CTR reporting requirement.23
The Ratzlafs, on the other hand, contended that to be guilty of
the crime of structuring, one must have knowledge of the legal duty
not to structure.2 4 According to the Ratzlafs, the mere act of structur-
ing with the intent to avoid CTRs is not enough to be guilty of the
crime.
C. In the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial
judge.25 In affirming the lower court, the court of appeals rejected
the Ratzlafs' reliance upon Cheek v. United States26 as well as the rule of
lenity in interpreting criminal statutes. 27
1. Cheek v. United States
The Ratzlafs relied upon Cheek for the proposition that to be guilty
§ 5324(b), supra note 15, involving structuring in importing and exporting monetary instru-
ments, is made a crime by § 5322.
21 See United States v. Ratzlaf, 976 F.2d 1280, 1283 (9th Cir. 1992).
22 Id. at 1282.
23 Id. The trial judge instructed the jury:
The government does not have to prove that the defendants knew that structur-
ing was unlawful[,] nor does the government have to prove that the defendants
knew of the existence of the law which they are charged with breaking ....
However, if a defendant did not have knowledge of a bank's duty to report
currency transactions in excess or [sic] $10,000, that may be considered a
defense.
Id.
24 See id. at 1284.
25 Id. at 1280. Note that the present case was not a case of first impression in the Ninth
Circuit. The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in United States v. Hoyland, 914 F.2d 1125
(9th Cir. 1990), and was in fact the second circuit to do so, see infra notes 100-04 and accom-
panying text. The Ratzlafs' primary contention on appeal was that the recent Supreme Court
decision, Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), effectively overruled the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Hoyland. Ratztaf 976 F.2d at 1281.
26 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
27 Ratz/af 976 F.2d at 1285-86.
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of the crime, one must recognize the legal duty that one is
transgressing.28
In Cheek, the defendant failed to file tax returns for several years in
the belief that wages were exempted from income as defined under
the tax laws.29 The defendant also claimed an excessive number of
deductions for several years to which he believed that he was enti-
tled.30 Sections 7201 and 7203 of Title 26 of the United States Code
prohibit the willful evasion of tax and the willful failure to file an in-
come tax return, respectively.31 The Supreme Court held that a tax-
payer acted willfully only when the taxpayer actually knew of the legal
duty that the taxpayer was charged with violating:
Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal tax
cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty
on the defendant, that the defendant knew this duty, and that he vol-
untarily and intentionally violated that duty.... [C)arrying this bur-
den requires negating a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law or a
claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-
faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax
laws.32
The Court acknowledged that the definition of willfulness it created in
the tax code was an exception to the common law definition requiring
only intentional action without knowledge of the legal duty violated,
but the Court felt such an exception was justified due to the extreme
complexity of the tax laws.3 3
The court of appeals felt such an exception in the antistructuring
laws to be unjustified: "[T]he currency structuring and reporting stat-
utes are not 'complex' in the sense that the Cheek Court used that term
in referring to the Internal Revenue Code."34 The court compared
the "tax code's lengthy list of income sources ... and the conditions
under which exemptions and deductions apply" against "the two things
outlawed by the money laundering statutes: failure of a financial insti-
tution to report transactions that exceed $10,000; and attempts ... to
prevent [CTRs]," finding the two areas of the law to be in "stark con-
trast" as to the intellectual difficulty involved in comprehending
them.35
2. The Rule of Lenity
The court of appeals also rejected the Ratzlafs' reliance upon the
rule of lenity in interpreting criminal statutes. The rule resolves in
28 Id. at 1281.
29 Cheek, 498 U.S. at 196 n.5.
30 Id. at 194.
31 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
32 Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201-02.
3I3 at 199-200.
34 United States v. Ratziaf, 976 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1992).
35 Id.
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favor of a defendant any ambiguity as to the mens rea required by a
criminal statute for conviction. 36 The court found the history of the
antistructuring statute and the plain meaning of the statutory language
unambiguous, and therefore, the rule of lenity inapplicable. 37
a. The History of the Antistructuring Statute
In 1970, Congress viewed transactions involving large amounts of
currency as possible evidence of criminal activity. 38 This view lead
Congress to enact the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,39 which requires in
part the reporting of currency transactions involving more than ten
thousand dollars. 40
The purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act, however, was defeated by
individuals who structured their financial transactions. While structur-
ing was not prohibited per se, the government succeeded in some cir-
cuits in prosecuting persons structuring their transactions, at least
where such individuals engaged in multiple currency transactions to-
taling more than ten thousand dollars at a single bank in a single
day. 41 Other circuits simply declined to convict for structuring.42
To prevent this circumvention of the reporting requirements by
structuring, Congress enacted section 532443 as part of the Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986.44 Section 5324(a), therefore, repre-
sents congressional response to the split in the circuits concerning the
illegality of structuring. According to the Ninth Circuit, a requirement
36 Id. (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Rewis v.
United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971)).
37 Id. at 1285-86.
38 See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1970, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4394, 4396 ("Criminals deal in money-cash or its equivalent. The deposit and withdrawal
of large amounts of currency or its equivalent... under unusual circumstances may betray a
criminal activity.").
39 Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (Bank Secrecy Act of 1970), Pub.
L. 91-508, Tit. II, 84 Stat. 1118 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5325 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
40 The threshold amount for reporting is set by the Secretary of the Treasury; it is not
specified in the statute. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). It also is interesting to
note that § 5313(a) imposes the reporting requirement on "any ... participant in the trans-
action." See id. However, the Secretary of the Treasury chose to impose the duty only on the
financial institution. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a) (1993).
41 See, e.g., United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 488 (1990) (citing United States v.
Heyman, 794 F.2d 788, 790-93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986); United States v.
Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1096-1101 (l1th Cir. 1983); United States v. Thompson, 603
F.2d 1200, 1202-04 (5th Cir. 1979)).
42 See, id., 900 F.2d at 488 (citing United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 679-83 (lst
Cir. 1985); United States v. Larson, 796 F.2d 244, 246-47 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Denemark, 779 F.2d 1559, 1563
(lth Cir. 1986)).
43 When originally enacted, § 5324 consisted entirely of what is now § 5324(a); subsec-
tion (b) was added by amendment in 1992 by the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering
Act, Pub. L. 102-550, Tit. XV, § 1525(a), 106 Stat. 4064 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)).
44 Pub. L. 99-570, Tit. I, Subtit. H, § 1354(a), 100 Stat. 3207-22 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
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that individuals structuring transactions must also know that structur-
ing is prohibited would undercut Congress' intention of closing the
loophole. 45
b. The Plain Meaning of the Statutory Language
Furthermore, according to the court of appeals in the present
case, Congress' failure to change the language of section 5322(a), and
its failure to specify that "a greater 'state of mind' would be required to
secure a conviction under [section 5324(3)] than that established by
section 5322,"46 together demonstrate congressional intent that "will-
fully" should be interpreted in its traditional meaning, i.e., as requiring
only intentional conduct.47 For support of this interpretation, the
court relied on the following example found in a Senate report accom-
panying an unenacted version 48 of the Money Laundering Crimes Act
of 1986:
[A] person who converts $18,000 in currency to cashiers checks by
purchasing two $9,000 cashier's checks at two different banks or on
two different days with the specific intent that the participating bank
or banks not be required to file [CTRs] for those transactions, would
be subject to potential civil and criminal liability.49
This example, according to the court, reveals that the specific intent
required is only the intent to structure the transaction so as to avoid
the reporting requirements, not the intent to commit a crime. 50
D. In the United States Supreme Court
The Ratzlafs appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court granted certiorari5 and reversed
the court of appeals in a five-to-four decision. 52 The Court did not
45 See United States v. Ratzlaf, 976 F.2d 1280, 1292 (9th Cir. 1992), and the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Hoyland, 914 F.2d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Congress
was aware that several circuits, including ours, had held it no crime to structure deposits so
that the reporting requirement would not be triggered. Congress changed the law to make it
a crime so to structure with the intent to prevent reporting. To act willfully under the statute
is to act with this intent." (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563,
1569 (11th Cir. 1992) ("It is highly unlikely that in passing the anti-structuring law... Con-
gress was somehow imposing an additional requirement that the defendant be aware of the
illegality of his or her conduct.").
46 Ratdaf 976 F.2d at 1286.
47 Id.
48 There were no House or Senate Reports submitted with the bill which passed, but
there were related congressional reports submitted on proposed versions of the various por-
tions of the final bill. See United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 537 (10th Cir. 1991). The
example cited by the Ninth Circuit in the present case comes from one of the related reports.
49 S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986).
50 Note that to be convicted under this interpretation of willful, however, the defendant
must be aware of the reporting requirement of § 5313(a). Without this knowledge, the de-
fendant cannot structure the transaction with the purpose of evading CTRs. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 5324(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Ratzlaf 976 F.2d at 1287.
51 Ratzlafv. United States, 507 U.S. 452 (1993).
52 Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
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base the reversal on Cheek or the lenity principle, however; it based its
decision on its view of the proper statutory construction of section
5322 in light of section 5324 and the other sections of the
subchapter. 53
1. The Five Justices' View
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg felt that "to give effect to
the statutory 'willfulness' specification," it is essential that the govern-
ment prove that the Ratzlafs knew structuring was unlawful. 54 She also
found a strong need to interpret "willfully" in a uniform manner for
each code section of the subchapter to which the criminal penalties
apply. 55
a. Giving Effect to "Willfully"
Justice Ginsburg first found support for the Court's decision in a
canon of statutory construction: "The trial judge in Ratzlaf's case, with
the Ninth Circuit's approbation, treated [section] 5322(a)'s 'willful-
ness' requirement essentially as surplusage-as words of no conse-
quence .... Judges should hesitate so to treat statutory terms in any
setting, and resistance should be heightened when the words describe
an element of a criminal offense."5 6
Hence, Justice Ginsburg observed that under the trial judge's in-
terpretation of sections 5322 and 5324, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,
one who violates section 5324 automatically violates section 5322. 57
One cannot be guilty of structuring under section 5324 without knowl-
edge of the reporting requirements, because one must engage in struc-
turing "for the purpose of evading" CTRs under section 5324.58 Similarly,
if someone engages in structuring for the purpose of evading CTRs,
then that person has not only violated section 5324, but also section
5322, because that person has intentionally and voluntarily, i.e., will-
fully, engaged in such activity.59
53 See id. at 657, 659.
54 Id. at 657.
55 Id. at 659.
56 Id. (citing Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990)
(expressing "deep reluctance" to interpret statutory provisions "so as to render superfluous
other provisions in the same enactment"); comparing it with Potter v. United States, 155 U.S.
438, 446 (1894) (word 'wilful" used to describe certain offenses but not others in same stat-
ute "cannot be regarded as mere surplusage; it means something.")).
57 Id. at 659.
58 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
59 Id. Note that the Ninth Circuit recognized this as well. United States v. Ratzlaf, 976
F.2d 1280, 1287 ("There is no danger that someone who does not know of the reporting
requirements could be convicted under [§ 5322(a)]; nor is there any way that one who knows
of the reporting requirements but who does not intend to prevent such reporting can be con-
victed of structuring. No one can be convicted of 'violating' section 5324(a) unless he or she
knows of the reporting requirements and that he or she is doing something to prevent such
reporting.").
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To avoid this words-of-no-consequence effect, Justice Ginsburg
agreed with the Ratzlafs that "willfully" of section 5322 should be inter-
preted as providing a heightened level of scienter. While "willful" may
denote various meanings, when viewed in light of section 5324, only
the interpretation requiring actual knowledge of illegality can raise the
scienter requirement of section 5322.60
b. The Need for a Single Interpretation
Justice Ginsburg also relied on a second canon of statutory inter-
pretation in reversing the Ninth Circuit: "A term appearing in several
places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it
appears .... We have even stronger cause to construe a single formula-
tion, here [section] 5322 (a), each time it is called into play."61 Accord-
ing to Justice Ginsburg, the courts of appeals in numerous cases
involving the application of section 5322 to sections of the subchapter
other than section 5324 have found a requirement that the defendant
have knowledge of unlawfulness. 62 Consequently, Justice Ginsburg re-
lied upon this second canon of statutory interpretation to support her
interpretation of section 5322's application to section 5324.63
2. The Four Justices' View
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Blackmun found the Court's de-
cision lacking textual support in the statute and conflicting with basic
principles of statutory interpretation, and consequently, squarely un-
dermining congressional intent.64
60 Ratz/af 114 S. Ct. at 659 (" 'Willful,' this Court has recognized, is a 'word of many
meanings,' and 'its construction' [is] often . .. influenced by its context.") (citing Spies v.
United States, 317 US. 492, 497 (1943)).
61 Ratz/af 114 S. Ct. at 660 (citations omitted) (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drill-
ing Co., 505 U.S. 42, 43 (1992); United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 498 (1st Cir. 1993) (en
banc)).
62 Justice Ginsburg wrote, "We count it significant that § 5322(a)'s omnibus 'willfulness'
requirement, when applied to other provisions in the same subchapter, consistently has been
read.., to require both 'knowledge of the reporting requirement' and a 'specific intent to
commit the crime.'" Ratz/af 114 S. Ct. at 661. For a similar interpretation by the First Cir-
cuit, see infra notes 120-125 and accompanying text. But see the interpretation given to these
cases by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Ratizaf infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
63 In reaching its decision, the Court rejected the United States contention that by en-
gaging in structuring, the willfulness requirement is satisfied, irrespective of the defendant's
knowledge of structuring's illegality, because structuring is obviously evil or inherently bad.
Ratzdaf 114 S. Ct. at 660.
Furthermore, while acknowledging evidence of a contrary interpretation in the legisla-
tive history of the antistructuring statute, the Court nevertheless declined to consider the
legislative history in reaching its decision: First, it felt that the statutory language was clear;
and second, even if it was ambiguous, the Court felt that it would resolve the ambiguity in
favor of the defendant, i.e., employ the rule of lenity. Id. at 661-62.
Finally, the Court refused to characterize its decision as departing from the venerable
principle that ignorance of the law is no defense to criminal liability. Instead, it held that the
present case was an example of where "Congress may decree otherwise." Id. at 662.
64 Id. at 663 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice O'Connor,
and Justice Thomas).
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a. The Lack of Textual Support
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the Court's decision "to give ef-
fect" to the willfulness requirement of section 5322 when applied to
section 5324(a).65 Justice Blackmun agreed that once a defendant has
violated section 5324 under the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, then
the defendant has automatically violated section 5322 and subjected
himself to criminal penalties. 66 However, Justice Blackmun relied
upon the applicability of section 5322 to violations of other sections of
the subchapter in declining to raise the scienter requirement of sec-
tion 5322. According to Justice Blackmun, section 5324, unlike all of
the other sections, defines the willfulness conduct that is sufficient for
criminal and civil liability, i.e., that the defendant act with the purpose
of evading CTRs.67 As the other provisions do not define willfulness,
these sections subsequently give the willfulness phrase in section 5322
its effect. Hence, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation does not render
the willfulness phrase "words of no consequence." 6
Furthermore, according to justice Blackmun, the Court's interpre-
tation of "willfulness" is contrary to its traditional meaning, excluding
the tax laws, and thus ill-conceived. "The general rule that ignorance
of the law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the
American legal system," quoted Justice Blackmun. 69 Declining to ex-
tend the exception applicable in tax law to section 5322, he agreed
with the Ninth Circuit that the tax laws are far more complicated and
thus more deserving of an exception than the antistructuring laws. 70
Finally, Justice Blackmun found fault with the Court's view of all
previous appellate cases construing "willfulness" with respect to other
sections of the subchapter. 71 Where the Court found a knowledge-of-
illegality requirement in each case, Justice Blackmun found only a
knowledge-of-CTRs requirement.72 He felt that the Court overlooked
the subtle difference between the two requirements:
"Knowledge of the reporting requirements" is easily confused
with "knowledge of illegality" because, in the context of the other re-
porting provisions- [section] 5313, [section] 5314, and [section]
5316-the entity that can "willfully violate" each provision is also the
entity charged with the reporting duty; as a result, a violation with
"knowledge of the reporting requirements" necessarily entails the en-
tity's knowledge of the illegality of its conduct (that is, its failure to file
65 Id. at 663-65.
66 Id. at 667.
67 Id. at 665.
68 Id. ("[Section] 5322(a) ... sets a single standard-willfulness-for the subchapter's
various reporting provisions. Some of those provisions do not themselves define willful con-
duct, so the willfulness element cannot be deemed surplusage.").
69 Id. at 664 (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)).
70 Id. at 667 ("The rule is inapplicable here, where, far from being complex, the provi-
sions involved are among the simplest in the United States Code.").
71 Id. at 665.
72 Id. at 665-66.
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a required report). In contrast, [section] 5324 prohibits a customer
from purposefully evading a bank's reporting requirements, so knowl-
edge of the reporting requirements does not collapse into actual
knowledge that the customer's own conduct is prohibited.73
Therefore, Justice Blackmun asserted that the issue of knowledge-
of-illegality arises only when section 5324 is involved, and thus, the
Court's reliance upon all other cases interpreting the application of
section 5322 to sections other than section 5324 is misplaced.
b. The Undermining of Congressional Intent
Justice Blackmun, although believing the statutory language un-
ambiguous, cited the legislative history of the antistructuring section
for support of his dissent. 74 Like the Ninth Circuit, he found that sec-
tion 5324 represented the congressional solution to the loophole of
structuring which arose after the Bank Secrecy Act of 197075 and that
Congress sought to cast a wide liability net, excluding only those inci-
dently engaged in structuring.76 Justice Blackmun thus felt that a
knowledge-of-illegality requirement only frustrates this congressional
intent,77 and that "[a]s a result of today's decision, Waldemar Ratzlaf
... will be 'laughing all the way to the bank.' "78
III. Background Law
A. Cases Applying Section 5322(a) to Violations of Section
5324(a)(3)
1. No Knowledge-of-Illegality Requirement
The Ninth Circuit was not alone in holding that section 5322(a)
does not require proof of knowledge-of-illegality for conviction where
there is a violation of section 5324(a) (3). Nine other circuits had
reached the same conclusion.79
73 Id. at 666 n.5.
74 Specifically, Justice Blackmun relied upon the example cited by the lower court,
supra note 49 and accompanying text, found in the Senate Report accompanying the Money
Laundering Act of 1986. He also relied upon a House Report accompanying an unenacted
version of the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act amending § 5324 to prohibit
structuring in the international regime. Ratz/af 114 S. Ct. at 669.
75 Id. at 668.
76 Id. at 669 n.7 (stating that " '[t]he antistructuring provision requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the purpose of the 'structured' aspect of a currency exchange was to
evade the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. It is this requirement which
shields innocent conduct from prosecution.") (quoting Hearing on § 571 and § 2306 before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 136-37 (1986)
(response of Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen. Knapp and Asst. U.S. Atty. Sun to written question of
Sen. D'Amato)).
77 Id. at 670 ("Now Congress must try again to fill a hole it rightly felt it had filled
before.").
78 Id.
79 See United States v. Baydoun, 984 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v.Jackson,
983 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 91 (5th
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The leading case on the issue, United States v. Scanio,80 was decided
in 1990. In Scanio, the defendant went to his bank on March 1, 1988,
to satisfy the balance on his line of credit, which totaled approximately
thirteen thousand dollars.8 1 When he tendered the amount due in
cash with an appropriate deposit slip, the bank informed him that a
CTR would be required.8 2 Not wishing to draw attention from the gov-
ernment because of a CTR, the defendant deposited ninety-five hun-
dred dollars on that day. He returned the next day and paid the
remaining balance.8 3
For this, the defendant was arrested and charged with violating
sections 5324(a) (3) and 5322(a).8 4 He subsequently was convicted
and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment, twenty-four months of
supervised release-conditioned upon payment of a five thousand dol-
lar fine and abstinence from gambling-and fined a special fifty dollar
assessment.8 5
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the defendant contended that
the government was required to prove knowledge by the defendant of
the illegality of his conduct.86 The Second Circuit rejected the defend-
ant's contention and affirmed his conviction. In reaching its decision,
the court first looked to the statutory language of the antistructuring
law, noting that the elements of the federal crime were established by
Congress.87 Thus, the court focused upon the term "willfully violating"
in section 5322(a).8 8
First acknowledging the traditional meaning of "willful" as requir-
ing only intentional conduct, the court then considered whether this
interpretation was constitutionally infirm.8 9 The court was concerned
that
(tihe primary purpose of the law, and the criminal law in particular, is
to conform conduct to the norms expressed in that law. When there is
no knowledge of the law's provisions, and no reasonable probability
that knowledge might be obtained, no useful end is served by prose-
cuting the 'violators.' 90
In this regard, the court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in
Lambert v. Calfornia.91 In Lambert, the issue surrounded the constitu-
Cir. 1992); United States v. Gibbons, 968 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Brown,
954 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1990).
80 900 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1990).
81 I. at 486.
82 1&
83 IdL at 487.
84 Id. at 486 (§ 5324(a) (3) was § 5324(3) before amendment in 1992).
85 Id. at 486 n.1.
86 Id. at 486.
87 Id. at 489.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 490.
90 Id. (quoting United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir. 1970)).
91 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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tionality of a city ordinance requiring convicted felons to register with
the police within five days of their arrival in the city. The Court held
"that due process barred the imposition of criminal liability, absent
proof that the defendant knew that she was obligated to register, since
the statute punished inaction, unaccompanied by any conduct, and
there were no circumstances which would alert the offender of the re-
gistration obligation."92
The Second Circuit found that the antistructuring law, without a
knowledge-of-illegality requirement, did not fall prey to invalidation
under Lambert.93 First, the court distinguished the law in Lambert,
which imposed a duty to register, with the antistructuring law, which
imposed a duty not to structure: Whereas the ordinance in Lambert
would be violated by inaction, the antistructuring law would be vio-
lated by affirmative conduct.94 Then the court concluded that because
one engaged in structuring would necessarily have knowledge of the
reporting requirements, it would be reasonable to presume one also
had knowledge of the duty not to structure. 95 This follows, according
to the court, because structuring deprives the government of its right
to information, and this deprivation, differing greatly from purely in-
nocent actions, imparts an element of wrongfulness to structuring, put-
ting the actor on notice. of possible prohibition. 96  Hence, the
affirmative conduct of structuring, because of its inherent badness, sat-
isfies any constitutional infirmity concerning the willfulness
requirement.97
Having satisfied itself as to the validity of section 5322(a) when
applied to section 5324(a) (3) with the traditional interpretation of
willfulness, the court looked to the congressional intent underlying the
antistructuring statutes.98 The court found that its interpretation ef-
fectuated Congress' clear intent for the same reasons as the Ninth Cir-
cuit and Justice Blackmun did in Ratzlaf99
92 Id. at 228-30.
93 Scanio, 900 F.2d at 490.
94 Id.
95 Id. ("[The defendant] engaged in affirmative conduct and demonstrated an aware-
ness of the legal framework relative to currency transactions which, it is reasonable to con-
clude, should have alerted him to the consequences of his conduct.").
96 See id at 491 ("[U]nlike § 5316 which requires individuals to report otherwise inno-
cent transactions, § 5324(3) prohibits purposeful conduct aimed at defeating the govern-
ment's right to information."); id. at 487 ("[lndividuals engaged in sizeable cash transactions
often are involved in criminal activity.").
97 It is interesting to note, however, that the Treasury Department proposed but did not
adopt regulations aimed at publicizing the antistructuring law. See 53 Fed. Reg. 7,948 (1988)
(proposing amendment to regulations); 54 Fed. Reg. 20,398 (1989) (withdrawing the pro-
posed amendment). The Second Circuit found this of little significance in deciding that one
engaged in structuring would reasonably have notice of such unlawful conduct. Scanio, 900
F.2d at 491-92.
98 Id. at 491.
99 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text, and notes 74-78 and accompanying
text, respectively.
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The next circuit to consider the issue was the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Hoyland.100 With facts somewhat similar to the facts in
Scanio, the Ninth Circuit concurred with the Second Circuit's decision
in Scanio, rejecting the knowledge-of-illegality requirement "as a matter
of statutory construction." 10 1 According' to the Ninth Circuit in Hay-
land, Congress clearly intended to plug the loophole created by struc-
turing in the Bank Secrecy Act.10 2 With respect to any constitutional
infirmity, it appears that the Ninth Circuit also felt that notice of prohi-
bition would inherently be found in structuring itself, as "structuring is
not the kind of activity that an ordinary person would engage in inno-
cendy."10 3 In fact, the court equated the inherent badness prohibited
by the antistructuring law to that prohibited by antidrug laws, finding
that "[i] t is no accident this proposition that 'the Constitution does not
require a knowingly criminal mind in order that an act be punished as
criminal' was established in cases dealing with drugs."10 4
The next circuit to consider the issue was the Tenth Circuit in
United States v. Dashney.10 5 It was the first circuit to consider the issue
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Cheek v. United States.'0 6 In
finding no knowledge-of-illegality requirement, the court explicitly
adopted the interpretation of the statute by the Second Circuit in
Scanio and the Ninth Circuit in Hoyland.10 7 The court rejected the de-
fendant's argument that "willfulness" should be interpreted in the
same manner as it was when read in conjunction with section 5316,108
requiring reports in the importation and exportation of monetary in-
struments. 10 9 Instead, the court found that a knowledge-of-illegality
requirement was implicit in section 5316 and that it did not originate
from section 5322(a)'s criminalization of willful violations of section
5316.110 Finally, with regard to Lambert and the "strong argument for
requiring a person to have knowledge of the illegality of his actions to
justify a conviction," the court felt that "in context of the statutes ...
no wholly innocent person faces such a predicament.""'
100 914 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1990).
101 Id. at 1129.
102 See id. ("Congress was aware that several circuits, including ours, had held it no
crime to structure deposits so that the reporting requirement would not be triggered....
Congress changed the law to make it a crime so to structure with the intent to prevent report-
ing. To act willfully under the statute is to act with this intent.").
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1128.
105 937 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1191), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 402 (1991).
106 498 U.S. 192 (1991). See supra notes 28-35 for a discussion of the possible implica-
tions of Cheek upon the present issue.
107 Dashney, 937 F.2d at 538-39.
108 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see supra note 18 for the text of § 5316.
109 Dashney, 937 F.2d at 539. The court found a knowledge-of-illegality requirement im-
plicit in § 5316 because the section prohibited what the court found would otherwise be
innocent conduct. Id.; see also infra note 137 and accompanying text.
110 Dashney, 937 F.2d at 539.
III Id.
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The remaining seven circuits to consider the issue, i.e., the Third
Circuit,1 12 the Fourth Circuit,113 the Fifth Circuit,114 the Sixth Cir-
cuit,'1 5 the Seventh Circuit, 116 the Eight Circuit, 117 and the Eleventh
Circuit,"18 reached the same conclusion as the first three circuits, gen-
erally adopting the same reasoning.
2. Proof of Knowledge-of-Illegality Required
The most recent circuit to consider this issue as one of first im-
pression prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ratzlaf was the First
Circuit in United States v. Aversa." 9 The court, en banc, unanimously
concluded that the defendant must have knowledge of the prohibition
against structuring to be convicted under section 5322(a) for a viola-
tion of section 5324(a) (3). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Ratzlaf it was the only circuit to find a knowledge-of-illegality
requirement.
According to the First Circuit, all the other circuits to consider the
issue "read section 5322 in an overly malleable manner.' 20 The First
Circuit, instead, felt a need to interpret "willfully" of section 5322 in a
uniform manner without regard to the section of the subchapter to
which it is applied. 12 1 The court wrote: "[W]hile Scanio and its prog-
eny adopt a flexible definition of willfulness, they [never] ... answer
the critical question of how differing definitions can attach to a single
usage of an operative term in a single statutory section."' 2 2 Further-
more, according to the court, Scanio and its progeny fail to respect the
statutory rule of construction that each and every legislative term
112 United States v. Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1992).
113 United States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1992).
114 United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1992).
115 United States v. Baydoun, 984 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1993). Actually, the Baydoun court
adopted the holdings of Scanio and its progeny in dictum. The case turned upon whether a
defendant could be convicted under § 5324(3) (a) for evading CTRs. When the defendant
learned that a "form" was required for making deposits over $10,000, he subsequently struc-
tured his transactions to avoid the "forms." At no time did the defendant know the forms
were to be reported to the government; he likely could assume, according to the court, that
they were in-house forms. Id. at 181. Hence, the court concluded in dismissing the case that
the defendant could not have possibly acted with the purpose of depriving the government
of its right to information. Id. at 180-81. One implication of the court's holding is that
structuring per se is not "bad" enough to put the defendant on notice of possible prohibition
of the conduct. See id. at 181-82 ("we find it most significant that.., the cash in question was
nontaxable and that drug monies were not involved. Thus ... there was no attempt ... to
engage in money laundering or to evade taxes due to the IRS.").
116 United States v.Jackson, 983 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1993).
117 United States v. Gibbons, 968 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1992).
118 United States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 284
(1992).
119 984 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1993) (en bane).
120 Id. at 496.
121 Id. at 498-99.
122 Id. at 497.
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should be given effect, i.e., willfulness is surplusage under Scanio.123
Having found willfulness to require knowledge-of-illegality in previous
cases involving application of section 5322(a) to other sections of the
subchapter, the court consequently adopted the same interpretation
when applying section 5322(a) to section 5324(a) (3).124 The court de-
clined to consider legislative history behind the antistructuring law
since it found resolution of the issue in the statutory construction and
plain meaning of the statute; however, it also discredited the legislative
history considered by the other circuits, noting that there was no
House or Senate report which accompanied the bill as enacted.1 25
In reaching its decision, the First Circuit, with one judge dissent-
ing,126 did agree with the other circuits that the standard in Cheek and
related tax cases did not apply.127 The Cheek standard would differ
from the knowledge-of-illegality requirement by allowing a subjective
but unreasonable mistake of law defense. 128 Such a defense is justified
in criminal tax prosecutions, according to the First Circuit, because of
the enormous complexity of the tax laws, complexity that is lacking in
the antistructuring law.129
B. Cases Applying Section 5322 (a) to Violations of Other Sections of
the Subchapter
The Supreme Court in Ratzlaf as did the First Circuit in Aversa,
based its decision in part upon the need for uniformity in interpreting
willfulness in section 5322. Hence, the application of section 5322 to
violations of sections other than section 5324 becomes relevant.
The provisions to which section 5322 applies are found in Sub-
chapter II of the Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act.'30 Sub-
chapter II, tiled "Records and Reports on Monetary Instruments
Transactions," imposes reporting requirements on domestic currency
transactions (section 5313(a)), 131 foreign currency transactions (sec-
123 Id. at 497 n.6 ("We cite this familiar tenet because there would have been no need for
Congress to include the term "willfully" at all if the government's reading of section 5322
were accurate.").
124 Id. at 496-98. Note also that under the court's previous cases, reckless disregard of
the law and willful blindness were sufficient for willfulness under § 5322(a). Id. at 498. The
court's decision in Aversa continues this standard.
125 Id. at 499 n.8.
126 Id. at 503 (TorruellaJ., dissenting) (believing that the Cheek mens rea should apply to
criminal structuring violations); see also id. at 502-03 (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding that the
court's decision was sufficiently close to the Cheek's mens rea for concurring in the court's
decision, but that if "writing on a blank slate, the similarity of the two sets of criminal laws
might well lead me to conclude that the same standard should apply.").
127 Id. at 500.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 501.
130 Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.). Subchapter II may be found at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-
5326 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
131 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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tion 5315(c)), 13 2 and the importation and the exportation of currency
(section 5316(a)).133 It also requires the maintenance of records and
reports on foreign financial agency transactions (section 5314).134
The criminal liability of section 5322 does not extend to violations of
section 5315, but does cover violations of sections 5313, 5314, and
5316, as well as 5324.135
Courts have invariably found that to be convicted for willfully vio-
lating sections 5313(a), 5314, or 5316, one must have knowledge of the
reporting requirements imposed by the section.' 3 6 The underlying
reasoning of these decisions is exemplified by the Second Circuit's de-
cision in United States v. Dichne:
Because the language of these sections [5316 and 5322] ... imposes
criminal liability only upon an individual who knowingly transports
monetary instruments in willful violation of [section 1516], and be-
cause [section 5316] requires the reporting of an otherwise innocent
act, it has consistently been held that the Government must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt the defendant's "knowledge of the reporting
requirement and his specific intent to commit the crime."
137
In fact, concerns of invalidation under Lambert have been echoed by at
least one court:
The requirement of knowledge of illegality is necessary... because
"[t]he isolated act of bringing in excess of $5,000 into the country is
not illegal or even immoral .... When typically innocent behavior is
criminalized, there is a strong argument for requiring a person to have
knowledge of the illegality of his actions to justify a conviction. 138
The court quieted these concerns by reading into section 5316 the
knowledge-of-the-duty-to-report requirement.13 9
132 31 U.S.C. § 5315 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
133 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
134 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
135 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
136 See, e.g., United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1476-77 (6th Cir. 1991) (§ 5314);
United States v. Bank of New England; N. A., 821 F.2d 844, 854-59 (1st Cir. 1987) (§ 5313);
United States v. Eisentstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) (§ 5313); United States v.
Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 890 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (§ 5316); United States v. Dichne, 612
F.2d 632, 636 (2d Cir. 1979) (§ 5316); United States v. Granada, 565 F.2d 922, 924-26 (5th
Cir. 1978) (§ 5316). Note, however, that intentional blindness or reckless disregard has been
found to satisfy the knowledge requirement. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 855.
137 Dichne, 612 F.2d at 636 (quoting Granada, 565 F.2d at 926). Note also the Second
Circuit's comment on the innocence of the act in sustaining the reporting requirements
against a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination attack:
(T]he reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act do not involve a direct
link to any related criminal activity. In fact, since there is nothing inherently
illegal about transporting large sums of money into or out of the United States,
any potential incrimination would of necessity involve a tangentially related
criminal transaction.
Id. at 640.
138 United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 539 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Lambert v. Cali-
fornia, 355 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1957) (citation omitted)).
139 See also Warren, 612 F.2d at 891 ("Requiring notice of the responsibility to report the
existence of currency before imposing criminal consequences fits in with the statutory
scheme.... In most cases, the mere transportation of money is an innocent act, more akin to
being present in a city (citing Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228-29).").
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IV. Analysis
A. The Court's Decision as a Matter of Positive Law
The Court's decision in Ratzlaf effectively overrules the decisions
in ten circuits and affirms the decision of one circuit. Remarkably, the
Court does this as a matter of statutory construction, implying that ten
circuits failed to apply correctly statutory rules in interpreting two in-
terrelated statutes. While the Court's reliance upon one tenet of statu-
tory construction does appear misplaced, the Court's application of
another tenet nevertheless justifies the result.
The Court incorrectly relied upon the tenet that every legislative
term should be given effect in a statute.1 40 This reliance is misplaced
because the term "willfully violating" was given effect by case law inter-
preting the scienter requirement for criminal violations of sections
5313, 5314, and 5316.141 In each of those sections, there is no refer-
ence to the required mens rea. Simply because Congress chose to in-
clude the mens rea of "for the purpose of evading' in section 5324 when it
amended the Bank Secrecy Act with the antistructuring section does
not lessen the effect of the language of "willfully violating" that is con-
tained within other sections. 142 In fact, the mens rea included by Con-
gress distinguishes the general mens rea derived from the traditional
interpretation of willfulness: Where traditional willfulness required
only intentional and voluntary action, the mens rea specified by Con-
gress in section 5324 must be "for the purpose of evading" CTRs, and
not for any other purpose.' 43
The second basis for the Court's decision justifies the Court's re-
sult: the need for uniformity in interpreting willfulness in section
5322's application to sections 5313, 5314, 5316, and 5324. It seems
apparent that in interpreting willfulness in applying section 5322 to
sections 5313, 5314, and 5316, the courts consistently have held that
for conviction the violators must have knowledge of the duty to re-
port.' 44 Arguably, it is this knowledge which saved the statute from
infirmity under Lambert.145
140 Note that the rationale of the Court's decision parallels that of the First Circuit's in
Aversa, see supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text. Therefore, this analysis is similarly
applicable to that decision.
141 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
142 See Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 665-66 (1994).
143 See, e.g., United States v. Dollar Bank Money Mkt. Account No. 1591768456, 980 F.2d
233, 241 (3d Cir. 1992), in which the court reversed summary judgment for the government
on an action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981 for forfeiture of property involved in a transaction
that violated § 5324(a). The court found as a valid defense to § 5324(a) the defendant's
belief that depositing more than $10,000 might draw attention from others and lead to bur-
glary. Thus, while acting willfully, the defendant still did not act with the required mens rea of
§ 5324. Id.
144 See, e.g., Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 661.
145 See United States v. Baydoun, 984 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1993). Although the court did
not address any constitutional issues, the court declined to find a violation of § 5324(a) for
[VOL. 19
MENS REA IN ANTISTRUCTURING VIOLATIONS
In interpreting willfulness in applying section 5322 to section
5324, there appears no basis for finding a different meaning from that
found in the case law. As the First Circuit pointed out in Aversa, Con-
gress could "have placed the antistructuring provision somewhere
other than in Subchapter II."146 As the Court explicitly noted in Rat-
zlaf " [h] ad Congress wished to dispense with [the current interpreta-
tion of willfulness], it could have furnished the appropriate
instruction." 147
The argument made by Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, that
courts have consistently interpreted willfulness to require knowledge
of the reporting requirements, but not knowledge of the duty to re-
port, i.e., knowledge-of-illegality,1 48 is fanciful at best. Under his inter-
pretation, knowledge of the reporting requirements is separated from
knowledge of the duty to report, placing the emphasis on the knowl-
edge of the reporting requirements. While theoretically distinguish-
able, the importance actually lies in knowledge of illegality, rather than
knowledge of the reporting requirements as he seems to suggest. This
is demonstrated by Lambert.149 The knowledge-of-illegality require-
ment protects an individual from conviction for doing an innocent act.
Knowledge of reporting requirements probably cannot provide this
protection, and would have to be evaluated under the following stan-
dard: Is knowledge of the reporting requirements of CTRs sufficient
to alert an individual of the illegality of structuring? 50
In sum, the Court's decision as a matter of statutory construction
is correct, although part of its reasoning is flawed. 151
B. The Court's Decision as a Matter of Normative Law
The Court's decision seems correct as a matter of normative law.
As the Court found, "currency structuring is not inevitably nefari-
evading a CTR where the defendant did not know the form that would have to be completed
for his deposit over $10,000 was required by law. Id.
146 United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 499 (1st Cir. 1993) (en banc).
147 Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 662.
148 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun states, "§ 5324 pro-
hibits a customer from purposefully evading a bank's reporting requirements, so knowledge
of the reporting requirements does not collapse into actual knowledge that the customer's
own conduct is prohibited." Ratz/af 114 S. Ct. at 666 n.5 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). Thus,
the test becomes: Does knowledge of the reporting requirements lead one to reasonably
surmise there is a duty not to avoid triggering of the reporting requirements?
151 The difference between the Court's decision and the First Circuit's in Aversa, com-
pared to the decisions by the other circuits, lies in the amount of deference each court gave
to the congressional intent expressed in the legislative history. The Ratz/afCourt and Aversa
court disregarded the legislative history, in part because they found the statutory language
unambiguous, and in part because there was no House or Senate report that accompanied
section 5324 as enacted. The other courts, also finding the statutory language unambiguous,
nevertheless looked to the legislative history in supporting their interpretation. Hence, this
is an excellent example of the subjectivity involved in determining the ambiguity of a statute.
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ous."152 Many people would prefer not to have their names brought to
the attention of the IRS, even though they are not involved in any illicit
activity. Without knowledge of illegality, some of those people un-
doubtedly will structure their transactions to avoid exceeding ten thou-
sand dollars. This is what the Ratzlafs did, for there was no indication
that the money was from any illicit activity or unreported income.15 3
To convict the Ratzlafs for structuring, then, seems harsh.
It is interesting to note that this equitable concern has manifested
itself in the case law. In Aversa, Judge Torruella dissented from the en
banc opinion, finding that it did not go far enough in limiting the
expansive liability net of the structuring statute to those with knowl-
edge of illegality.' 54 Judge Torruella would limit the application of
section 5324 to recipients of illegal drug funds, individuals engaged in
money laundering activities, tax evaders, and others connected to illicit
activity.155 As he concluded, "[w] e should not stand idly while this over-
reaching transforms common citizens into criminals."' 56
C. Implications of the Court's Decision
1. Structuring in the Importation and Exportation of Monetary
Instruments
A natural and logical result of the Court's holding is that the gov-
ernment must prove that a defendant who engaged in structuring the
exportation or importation of monetary instruments to avoid CTRs
had knowledge that such structuring was prohibited by law. This fol-
lows from the fact that subsection (b) 157 of section 5324 mirrors sub-
section (a),' 58 the structuring provision involved in Ratzlaf Under the
uniform interpretation theory of willfulness, application of section
5322 to section 5324(a) should be identical to application of section
5322 to section 5324(b).
A potential dilemma arises, however, if courts consider the legisla-
tive history of the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, which
amended section 5324 in 1992 to add the prohibition against the struc-
turing of international monetary transportation. 59 As Justice Black-
mun pointed out in his dissent in Ratzlaf Congress viewed the courts as
having uniformly interpreted willfulness in applying section 5322 in
conjunction with section 5324 as not requiring knowledge-of-illegal-
152 Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 660-61.
153 See id. at 660-61 n.ll.
154 United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 503 (1st Cir. 1993) (Torruella, J., dissenting).
155 Id.; see also id. at 505 ("Congress' purpose .. was to detect and punish 'financial
transaction[s] represent[ing] the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.' 18 U.S.C.
§ 1965(a) (1).").
156 Id. at 505.
157 For the text of § 5324(b), see supra note 15.
158 For the text of § 5324(a), see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
159 Pub. L. 102-550, Tit. XV, § 1525(a), 106 Stat. 4064.
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ity. 160 For instance, a House Report accompanying an earlier bill of
the international structuring prohibition states:
Under the new subsection provision, codified as subsection (b) of sec-
tion 5324, it would be illegal to structure the importation or exporta-
tion of monetary instruments with the intent to evade the reporting
requirement. As is the case presently for structuring cases involving
currency transaction reports, the government would have to prove
that the defendant knew of the ... reporting requirement, but would
not have to prove that the defendant knew that structuring itself had been made
illegal 161 
i
Resolution of this dilemma undoubtedly should result in a knowl-
edge-of-illegality requirement, however. Many courts have shown a
great reluctance to credit congressional reports accompanying earlier
versions of a bill.162 All evidence of the congressional intent concern-
ing this issue is found in such documents. Second, it is evident under
Ratzlaf that the legislative intent should be disregarded as the plain
meaning and language of the statute are unambiguous. The plain
meaning and language must be unambiguous as a matter of law be-
cause the Ratzlaf Court now has construed the identical language in
the identical statutory setting as unambiguous.
In sum, until Congress revises the antistructuring law, it is safe to
conclude that knowledge-of-illegality must be proved for conviction of
structuring international transportation of monetary instruments into
or out of the United States.
2. Currency Structuring: An Innocent Act
Finally, note the consequences of the Court's characterization of
currency structuring. While the Court found a knowledge-of-illegality
requirement behind the willfulness of section 5324, the invitation for
Congress to amend section 5324, if dissatisfied with the Court's deci-
sion, is implicit in the opinions.163 However, if Congress chooses to
amend the section by removing the judicially imposed knowledge-of-
illegality requirement, a serious question will arise as to whether the
statute passes muster under Lambert. This results from the Court's
finding that "currency structuring is not inevitably nefarious." 164 Previ-
ous decisions applying the statute under this interpretation have relied
upon the finding that structuring is inherently bad, i.e., it deprives the
government of its right to information, in order to justify conviction
160 Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 670 (1994).
161 H.R. REP. No. 28(I), 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 45 (1991) (emphasis added).
162 See, e.g., United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 499 n.8 (1st Cir. 1993).
163 See Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 662 (1994) ("Had Congress wished to dispense with the re-
quirement, it could have furnished the appropriate instruction."); id. at 670 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("Now Congress must try again to fill a hole it rightly felt it had filled before.").
164 Id. at 660-61.
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under Lambert.165 To these courts, the inherent badness has consti-
tuted sufficient circumstances to put the defendant on alert of the pos-
sible illegality of his actions. After the Court's decision in Ratzlaf, these
courts no longer can rely upon this inherent badness.
V. Conclusion
The Court's five-to-four decision in Ratzlaf v. United States repre-
sents an abrupt change from the case law as defined by ten courts of
appeals. To obtain a conviction for structuring currency transactions
in order to avoid triggering currency transaction reports, the govern-
ment must now show that the defendant knew structuring was illegal.
The remarkable aspect of the Court's decision is that it represents a
pure exercise in statutory construction.
Following a similar approach in statutory interpretation, it directly
follows that conviction for the structuring of the importation and ex-
portation of monetary instruments to avoid reporting requirements
also now will require proof that the defendant knew of the illegality of
the structuring.
Furthermore, if, as the ten courts of appeals believed, Congress
did not intend a knowledge-of-illegality requirement for conviction,
then the Court's characterization of currency structuring as an inno-
cent act could subject the criminal provisions, when applied to antis-
tructuring, to constitutional attack. The reason would be that
although the defendant knew of the reporting requirement, there is
no reason to expect the defendant to suspect illegality in structuring
because it is an innocent act.
C. DUSTIN TILLMAN
165 See, e.g., United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 491 (2d Cir. 1990); see also supra notes
89-111 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 19
